معرفت فلسفی

This article critically examines Wolfson’s position in his essay, “The Terms Mushakkik and Tashkīk in Aristotle, Islamic Philosophy, and Maimonides,” through a comparative analysis of the theory of gradation (tashkīk) in the Aristotelian and Ṣadrian philosophical systems. The findings indicate that Aristotelian gradation remains largely confined to the domains of logic and linguistic analysis. Owing to the absence of a clear distinction between existence and quiddity, it fails to move beyond the realm of concepts and quiddities into that of objective ontology. By contrast, the Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya), grounded in the doctrine of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), relocates gradation from the conceptual order to the domain of extramental and objective reality. By articulating its four constitutive principles and providing a genuinely ontological criterion for unity and multiplicity, Mullā Ṣadrā develops a novel and systematic account of the structure of being. The results of this study demonstrate that, contrary to Wolfson’s claim, gradation in Islamic philosophy—particularly in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā—is not merely a conceptual or logical device. Rather, it constitutes a system-forming ontological structure grounded in the primacy of existence and provides a comprehensive explanation of the hierarchical order of reality. Ultimately, by elucidating the fundamental differences between Aristotle’s logical-linguistic conception of gradation and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological account, this study reveals the profound theoretical distance separating the two approaches.