معرفت فلسفی

“Existential Overlapping” of God and Creatures

Sayyid MuhammadMahdi Nabawiyan / PhD Student of Philosophy Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Ghulam Reza Fayyazi / Professor of Philosophy Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute                                 Received: 2014/11/23                               Accepted: 2015/06/25

ABSTRACT

One of the important discussions that has attracted the attention of religious scholars is the relationship between creatures and God. Philosophers and mystics have also commented on this issue, explaining that relationship according to their own tenets. Existential overlapping is one of the new ideas that puts forward a novel view about this issue. According to this view, the infinite existence of God, while being present in all existential realms with no realm lacking His existence, is by no means inconsistent with real existence of creatures. In other words, God's existence would be overlapping with the existential realm of creatures. According to this theory, creatures also have real existence, just like God, but their existential realm would not be separate from that of God; otherwise, it necessitates God's finite existence. Indeed, creatures inhabit the same existential realm as God, in a way that each creature is overlapping with God's existence in proportion to its own existential order. This article presents a precise meaning of "overlapping" (tadākhul) and states its difference with other semantically similar terms to explain the theory of existential overlapping, and ends with some evidences from Quranic verses and traditions.

KEYWORDS: the relationship of God and creatures, overlapping, overlapping of matters, existential overlapping, convergence and immanence.

Mediums of [Divine] Grace in Sadrā’i Philosophy

Baqir Ibrahimi / MA of Philosophy Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Muhammad Fanai’e Ishkevari / Associate Professor in Department of Philosophy Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute

Received: 2014/07/26                             Accepted: 2015/05/15

ABSTRACT

One of the Islamic theological doctrines is related to the mediums of [divine] grace mentioned in the Quran and traditions – mediums such as the Pen, the Heaven, the Throne, the Preserved Tablet, the Tablet of Effacement and Affirmation, and the Angels. Cosmological explanation of these facts and specifying their status in the system of creation are among important discussions in Islamic theology. Mullā Sadrā (or Sadr al-Muta’allihīn) who attempts to present philosophical explanations for religious doctrines has sought to explain – based on his own philosophical system – the mode of existence of those mediums and their role in transferring divine grace. The present study seeks to investigate his explanation of those mediums and their status in existence to present a correct picture of them, while stating their mode of existence and the existential features of each. Mullā Sadrā refers to the levels of divine knowledge and regards those realities as various levels of divine knowledge, belonging to the realm of intellects or spirits, based on their existential order.

KEYWORDS: [divine] grace, mediums of [divine] grace, the Pen, the Throne, the Tablet, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn.

A Comparative Study of the Philosophical Secondary Intelligible  in Suhrawardī's and Mullā Sadrā's Views

Maryam Hassan-pur / MA of Philosophy and Islamic Theology Allama Tabatabaie University

Muhammad Pur-Abbas / PhD Student of Islamic Teachings Allama Tabatabaie University

Qudsiya Akbari / Tenure Professor in Zahedan University

Received: 2014/11/16                             Accepted: 2015/08/10

ABSTRACT

Resorting to the principle of "anything whose existence implies its repetition is conventional", Suhrawardī regards both philosophical and logical concepts as merely mental, believing that philosophical concepts – just like logical concepts – have both Oruze Khareji and Ettesaf Khareji. On the contrary, later well-known philosophers believe that philosophical concepts, while having Oruze Khareji, and Ettesaf Khareji. Mullā Sadrā first accepts the well-known view, but ultimately comes to the idea that philosophical concepts have both Oruze Khareji and Ettesaf Khareji. Thus, although philosophical concepts have external realizations, they have no concrete existence; rather, they enjoy integrated existence.

KEYWORDS: primary intelligibles concepts, secondary logical intelligibles, secondary philosophical intelligibles, Suhrawardī, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn.       

An Inquiry into Conventional (I‘tibāri) Concepts in Allama Tabatabaie's View and the Way They Are Formed

Husna Humayun / MA of Islamic Philosophy Tarbiat Modarres University

Reza Akbariyan / Professor in Department of Philosophy Tarbiat Modarres University

Received: 2014/09/12                             Accepted: 2015/06/08

ABSTRACT

According to Allama Tabatabaie, concepts are created in the mind just through quiddities; thus, philosophical concepts are formed from quiddities or primary intelligibles. In his theory of reasoning, he distinguishes between two groups of concepts: factual concepts and conventional ones. These two groups of intelligibles are the same as primary and secondary logical and philosophical intelligibels, dealt with by Allama Tabatabaie with a special view, explaining the way they are formed in the mind. He divides the conventional concepts into three groups: a) mental concepts, created from other mental concepts, b) conventional concepts, formed through a comparison between the soul and its actions and faculties, and c) conventional concepts, created through independently positing the judgment in propositions.

Conventional concepts created from judgment in propositions are more important than the other two types, because they include basic philosophical concepts such as existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, potentiality and actuality. The strong point of this theory is clarifying the way conventional concepts are formed and the way the conformity between the concept created in the mind and its true instance in real world –regarding those concepts which are created in the mind while having external instances– is preserved. Although Allama's attempt in explaining how those concepts are formed is a basic and creative one, his theory must be reviewed in some aspects; the most important among them are: mixing up the judgment in an affirmation and connective existence in propositions, introduced as the origin of the concept of existence.

KEY WORDS: reasoning, secondary intelligibles, conventional concepts, assertion, concept of existence, Allama Tabatabaie.           

The Status of Philosophy in Allama Tabatabaie's Exegetical Method; with an Emphasis on the Question of Divine Agency

Sayyid Muhammad Ali Dibaji / Associate Professor in Tehran Universit

Sayyid Ruhullah Musawi / PhD Student of Islamic Philosophy and Theology/ Tehran University

Received: 2014/09/12                                            Accepted: 2015/06/08

ABSTRACT

The present article seeks to answer the question, what was the effect of Allama Tabatabaie's philosophy on his exegesis? In other words, what is the status of philosophy in Allama's exegetical method? Here, we will attempt to deal with this question in an objective and comparative way. To do so, we study and compare the discussion on 'divine agency' – both as an important philosophical issue and an important and frequently posed Quranic issue – in Allama's exegesis and his philosophy. Based on the findings of this study, Allama's broad philosophical knowledge and his systematic use of that knowledge in his exegesis of the Quran has not led to imposition of philosophical meanings on the Quran and neglecting the obvious meanings of its words; rather, it has prepared the ground for a stronger commitment to the appearance of the Quran, while assisting the commentator for a broader and deeper understanding of its meanings.

KEYWORDS: Allama Tabatabaie, al-Mizan, philosophy, exegesis, divine agency

Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay

Akbar Faydeie / Educator in Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theosophy Shahid Madani University of Azerbaijan

Naser al-Reza Ziyaei-nia / PhD Student of Philosophy and Principles [of Jurisprudence]/ Seminary, Qom

Received: 2014/10/12                             Accepted: 2015/08/03

ABSTRACT

The oldest theory about the nature of truth and falsity is Aristotle's theory of correspondence, or defining the truth of propositions as their consistency with reality. Muslim philosophers have justified the criterion of truth and falsity according to that theory, interpreting the reality of propositions as Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay. Defining the truth and falsity of propositions by corresponding them to "Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay" among Muslim philosophers has led to the objection that application of this definition to the mental and true propositions seems to be unjustifiable. Thus, they have sought to analyze the concept of " Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay" to show how the truth of various propositions are established through reality. In analyzing the concept of Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay and its correspondence to various propositions, they have presented different interpretations including " Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay" The present article studies and explains it.

KEYWORDS: truth and falsity, correspondence theory, Tafsir Nafs Al-amr Be Nafs Al-Sh'ay, Islamic philosophers.