Abstract:
The internal consistency of a philosophical system is essential for its coherence and effectiveness. The doctrine of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), as the foundation of transcendent wisdom, has cast a shadow over most philosophical issues within this school reshaping the fate of many discussions.
The essential kernel of the issue of "mental existence" has led to the notion that the theory of "mental existence" is framed within the context of the primacy of Quiddity. Even though some Sadrian philosophers have discussed mental existence, it is viewed as a pretended concession to the views of earlier thinkers and not as their ultimate attitude.
Therefore, in his paper, the author aims to examine, firstly, whether, assuming the acceptance of the essential unity between the mind and the external world, mental existence is compatible with the framework of the primacy of existence. Secondly, it seeks to investigate whether the different interpretations of the doctrine of the primacy of existence play a role in its compatibility with the theory of mental existence.
In this study, three theories "relative compatibility", "absolute incompatibility", and "ambiguous compatibility" are presented and critically analyzed. It is shown that the theory closest to reality is the "ambiguous compatibility" theory. The author, by further developing it, presents the theory of "absolute compatibility," according to which, based on all the common interpretations of the doctrine of the primacy of existence, one cannot decide that the theory of mental existence merely stands on the primacy of quiddity. Therefore, there is no inherent contradiction between the issue of the primacy of existence and that of mental existence.