Ma`rifat Falsafi

This paper aims to elucidate the nature of metaphysics in Kant's thought and analyze his criteria for its status as a science. The central questions are: Is metaphysics possible as a science? And if not, how is its position defined within Kant's philosophical system? In response to these questions, Kant, on the one hand, deems traditional metaphysics as an impossible theoretical science by proposing the criterion of "synthetic a priori judgments," arguing that it lacks the necessary sensory intuition to validate its pure concepts. On the other hand, by introducing "metaphysics as a natural predisposition," he justifies it as an inevitable propensity of human reason, which serves a regulative function in organizing empirical knowledge. By establishing the distinction between "appearance" and "noumenon" and defining "transcendental philosophy" as the new metaphysics, Kant effectively coins a new conception of metaphysics. Employing an analytical-descriptive method and focusing on the Critique of Pure Reason, this study first analyzes the duality of Kant's approach to metaphysics—as both an impossibility in the realm of theoretical science and a necessity as a natural predisposition. Finally, it presents the most significant challenges to this philosophical system, including the contradiction inherent in the concept of the noumenon, the unwarranted limitation of the sources of knowledge, and the paradox of self-refutation, outlined along ten fundamental axes.