Ma`rifat Falsafi

The present article elucidates the nature of metaphysics in Kant’s thought and examines the criteria for its scientific status from his perspective. The central question is: Is metaphysics possible as a science? And if not, how is its position defined within the Kantian system? In his response, Kant argues on the one hand that by establishing the criterion for ‘synthetic a priori propositions,’ traditional metaphysics is rendered impossible as a theoretical science. On the other hand, by introducing ‘metaphysics as a natural competence,’ he defines a regulatory function for the organization of empirical knowledge. By distinguishing between the ‘noumenon’ and the ‘phenomenon’ and defining ‘transcendental philosophy’ as a new form of metaphysics, he constructs a new concept of the discipline. In this new approach, the possibility of thinking about the truth and the ‘thing-in-itself’ is entirely precluded. This research, employing an analytical-descriptive method and focusing on the Critique of Pure Reason, first analyzes the dichotomy of Kant’s approach to metaphysics -viewing it as both an impossibility in the realm of theoretical science and a necessity in the realm of natural competence. Finally, the study presents the most significant challenges to this system of thought, including the contradiction in the concept of the ‘noumenon,’ the unjustifiable restriction of the sources of knowledge, and the self-defeating paradox, framed within nine fundamental axes.