Ma`rifat Falsafi

Aristotle attaches corporeal contingency to soul, and believes that the corporeal soul does not hold the qualification of intellection or the intellectual perception. The intellectual perception and intellectual form are immaterial objects, and intellection needs an immaterial entity. Therefore, Aristotle leaves intellection to intellect, but what is the relation between this immaterial intellect and the material soul, and how does it play a role in intellection? Aristotle’s theory is ambiguous, and this ambiguity should be cleared. Avicenna regards soul as an immaterial object; distinguishes its state of essence from its state of action, and attributes intellectual perception to the soul. He believes intellectual perception is an essential act of the soul, and soul is considered to be the same as the particular intellect. Avicenna calls the influence of Active Intellect on creating the intellectual forms in human intellective soul as effusion and illumination with regard to its quiddity and existence. This article is an analysis and explanation of Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s views on the problem of intellection.