Abstract:
The issue of "whether metaphysics can be considered a science" is one of the fundamental discussions in philosophy, which has gained more complex dimensions with Kant's critical system. The importance of this issue lies in the fact that the fate of other branches of knowledge depends on the quality of the response to this question. This research, using a comparative-analytical method, examines the viewpoints of Kant and Allamah Misbah Yazdi in this regard. The findings of the research indicate that Kant, by distinguishing between phenomenon and noumenon and introducing the criterion of synthetic a priori judgments, deems traditional metaphysics impossible; however, he himself faces significant challenges, including contradictions in explaining the thing-in-itself, methodological self-refutation, and reductionism in the analysis of philosophical concepts. In contrast, Allamah Misbah Yazdi, relying on presential knowledge, the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibles, and the reality-representing nature of philosophical concepts, presents a coherent epistemological system that makes the knowledge of meta-sensory truths possible. The examinations show that Kant's critique of metaphysics, despite its flaws, addresses the imperfect forms of metaphysics, not its essence, and transcendent theosophy (al-hikmah al-muta'āliyah), by presenting a more complete form of metaphysics, has opened new capacities for establishing metaphysics as a valid science.