Ma`rifat Falsafi

The present article briefly explains Frege’s theory of proper names and investigates the objections presented by Kripke to that theory. The writers distinguish the two different versions of Frege’s theory – also acknowledged by Kripke – and hold that the first version is defeated in facing with Kripke’s objection regarding the necessity in possible worlds. Then, they state two readings (subjective and objective) of the second version of Frege’s theory, and accept Kripke’s objection to the objective reading by adducing the errors of the speakers in connecting one group of attributes to an external referent. The writers, however, offer Kripke’s various objections to the subjective reading to defend it against those objections; except for the existential statements (affirmative and negative), they answer all other objections regarding the puzzles of ‘identity’ and ‘substitution’ and so on. The article concludes that the subjective reading of the second version of Frege’s theory has the least drawbacks and the most power to explain, and seems more justified in comparison to the two groups of ‘denotation/ direct reference’ and the ‘first version of Frege’s theory’.