Ma`rifat Falsafi

After the discovery of defects in Descartes’ epistemological structure and revealing the skeptical implications in it by philosophers such as Locke, Barkley and Hume, despair of achieving the knowledge and cognition filled the philosophical atmosphere of the eighteenth century. The first who systematically confronted modern skepticism was Thomas Reid. Relying on the basics of common sense, he challenged the theory of thoughts – postulated by skeptics – and introduced it as inconsistent with common sense. In the present article, we attempt to use Reid’s books and other writings regarding his ideas to explain Reid’s objections to the theory of thoughts and his alternative theory on perception. In addition, we will explain his arguments against the skeptics’ avarices including reasoning based on inability, necessity of precaution and precedent, and his argument of regarding having to trust the belief-making forces. At the end, we will deal with methodology of reason in Reid’s view; and in the section of conclusion, we will state that we have no choice except to trust the belief-making forces.