Ma`rifat Falsafi

In the present article, the theory of “realization” put forward by physicalists adherent to functionalism, has been investigated from the viewpoint of the extent to which it has been successful in solving the problem of mental causation. The authors show that various versions and editions of that idea have not managed to solve the problem of mental causation; rather they have recessed to typical identity and reductionism, or have involved in double causal determination. In the present article, Shoemaker’s “subset theory” presented in 2007 and Yablo’s theory of “particularism” presented in 1992 have been explained, both of them as versions of realization theory. The authors have shown that the two theorists have sought to prove the originality and objectivity of mental features (an escape from reductionism) and to present a picture of exerting a causal force by those features. Afterwards, however, by presenting the criticisms of Kim and others, they show the continuity of the problem of causal deprivation and involvement in reductionism in both readings.