Ma`rifat Falsafi

In the domain of epistemology, being true and corresponding to reality are considered as the criteria for epistemological value. Despite alternative views, there is a consensus among Muslim philosophers on this. Scrutinizing this issue, one recognizes that this criterion is only applicable to knowledge by representation (al-‘ilm al-husuli). This runs counter to the fact that knowledge has a general meaning in the tradition of Islamic epistemology, and includes knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-huduri) too. Hence, the question arises as to whether knowledge by presence has any epistemological value; and if yes, how this criterion is applicable to this type of knowledge. The author tries to suggest a new interpretation of epistemological value, so that it incorporates knowledge by presence. According to this new meaning, being truly representational is a general criterion, and being self-representational is a specific criterion for epistemological value. Knowledge by presence is epistemologically valuable because it is self-representational. On this footing, the author discusses new requisites for epistemological value.