Ma`rifat Falsafi, Volume 9, Issue 1, No 33, Year 2011, Pages 133-162
A Critique of Physicalism on the Basis of its Division into A priori and A posteriori
Article Type:
Research
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Abstract:
Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists agree with each other in holding that physicalism, as a metaphysical approach to the world, is an appropriate approach that includes the nature of mind. However, they disagree on whether certain truths are knowable a priori. Of course, both of them_ a priori physicalists and a posteriori physicalists_ maintain that the doctrine “physicalism” can only be known a posteriori. Despite such a consensus, there is no consent about how exactly the doctrine should be formulated.
The author has a critique of physicalism on the basis of this dispute and its division into a priori and a posteriori. It seems that physicalism requires a priori knowledge, but on the other hand, it seems also that it is impossible. It seems that there are some a priori entailments (implications) from microphysical truths to ordinary macroscopic truths. But it will be argued that there are no a priori entailments (implications) from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths because these truths cannot be functionalized. The purpose of this article is to argue that since such entailments (implications) are necessary for physicalism to be true, physicalism would be false regarding the phenomenal consciousness.
چکیده و کلیدواژه فارسی (Persian)
Title :نقدى بر فیزیکى انگارى بر مبناى اختلاف میان فیزیکى انگارى پیشینى و پسینى
Abstract:
فیزیکىانگارى پیشینى و پسینى، در فیزیکى انگاشتن جهان (و به طور خاص، ذهن یا نفس)، با یکدیگر همرأى هستند و فیزیکىانگارى را در مقام رهیافتى مابعدالطبیعى در باب تعیین ماهیت ذهن، حالات ذهنى، و ویژگىهاى ذهنى تأیید مىکنند. محلّ نزاع و اختلاف میان این دو تلقّى در این مسئله نهفته است که: آیا صدق و کذب فیزیکىانگارى وابسته به شناختپذیر بودن برخى حقایق خاص به طور پیشینى است یا نه؟ حامیان فیزیکىانگارى پیشینى بر لزوم این وابستگى تأکید مىکنند؛ ولى دسته مقابل منکر آن هستند. مقاله حاضر صورتبندى نقدى است بر فیزیکىانگارى بر مبناى واکاوى این اختلاف. نگارنده که در این مسئله، خود با فیزیکىانگاران پیشینى موافق است، استدلال خواهد کرد که براى صدق فیزیکىانگارى، وجود رابطه استلزامى از هر دو نوع آن (استلزام دلالتشناختى و استلزامشناختى)، میان امر فیزیکى و ذهنى، ضرورى است. با این حال، نگارنده امکان چنین شناختى را منتفى مىداند و دستکم روابط استلزامى از نوع معرفتى آن را مورد انکار قرار مىدهد. او با پیمودن این مسیر، تلاش مىکند تا کذب فیزیکىانگارى را نشان دهد.
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Copyright © 2011 The Author(s). This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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Ghiasvand, Mahdi. (2011) A Critique of Physicalism on the Basis of its Division into A priori and A posteriori. Ma`rifat Falsafi, 9(1), 133-162
Mahdi Ghiasvand."A Critique of Physicalism on the Basis of its Division into A priori and A posteriori". Ma`rifat Falsafi, 9, 1, 2011, 133-162
Ghiasvand, M.(2011) 'A Critique of Physicalism on the Basis of its Division into A priori and A posteriori', Ma`rifat Falsafi, 9(1), pp. 133-162
