Ma`rifat Falsafi

The main issue of this study is to examine Christopher Franklin’s response to the "explanatory formulation of the luck argument" using a descriptive-analytical method. The aim is to critically evaluate the foundational aspects of the explanatory formulation and Franklin's response to it, in the light of the incorrectness of "considering the cause of something as its justification". Based on the explanatory formulation, with the acceptance of indeterminism, it is impossible to explain why the agent performed act "B" instead of act "A," and this leads to "luck." In his explanatory formulation of the luck argument, Franklin distinguishes between two types of contrasting explanations. Accordingly, the type one contrasting explanation renders the second premise of the argument false, while the type two renders the first premise false. As a result, no interpretation of the contrasting explanation validates all the premises of the luck argument. The insistence of determinists on presenting the type one contrasting explanation is based on the prior acceptance of psychological determinism, which, in addition to being question-begging, is also not accepted by the majority of compatibilists. Although Franklin’s response to this problem is acceptable, the libertarianism proposed by Franklin, as well as the explanatory formulation of the luck problem, is based on "considering the cause of something as its justification". However, the problem of normativity shows that psychological reasons of the agent cannot play a causal role in the formation of actions, and as a result, the underlying assumption of the explanatory formulation of the luck problem is incorrect and Franklin’s response fundamentally fails.