Ma`rifat Falsafi

The question of the nature of the mind, the criterion of mindset, and the distinction between mental and non-mental entities are the starting points in the philosophy of mind. A category of criteria for distinguishing mental entities are epistemological criteria. This article examines the criteria of direct knowledge, secluded privileged access, inerrancy, and transparency. These criteria have faced objections, the result of which is their failure to be both inclusive and exclusive, their failure in distinguishing between the mental and the non-mental. Due to the division of knowledge into husuli (acquired) and huduri (intuitive) in Islamic philosophy, these criteria have been reinterpreted. Accordingly, responses to the aforementioned objections have been provided, particularly emphasizing that intuitive knowledge of mental states is inerrant. The errors that typically occur in accurately recognizing mental states pertain to the realm of their acquired and conceptual representations and, therefore, do not violate the epistemological criteria. However, it must, ultimately, be said that it seems these kinds of epistemic accesses are not exclusive to mental entities. Accordingly, although they are free from some objections and violations, they do not provide complete criteria for the mindset nor they help distinguish the mental from the non-mental.