A New Analysis of Ontological Features of Mental Action of
Subjective Consideration (Iʻtebar)

Abdullah Fathi / Assistant Professor in Department of Philosophy IKI   abdollahfathy@yahoo.com

Mujtaba Mesbah / Associate Professor in Department of Philosophy IKI                              M-mesbah@Qabas.net

Received: 2017/09/21 - Accepted: 2018/04/28

ABSTRACT

The propositions pertaining to the common affairs of life include certain affairs such as address, house, bank account, seminary school, university, president, inflation and law, which are not in the group of objective affairs such as existential characteristics of things. In the literature of Islamic philosophy, these are called ‘conventional’ affairs, to which no ontological reality is attributed. However, there are serious and unresolved philosophical questions in this regard. Among these questions are two things that are clearly distinguishable: one is ‘convention’ as the source of subjectively considered affairs, and the other is the conventional affairs themselves. In the present article, some issues pertaining to ‘convention’ are discussed and investigated. The main issue in this article is as follows: “what ontological feature does the ‘convention’ have?” Under this question, other subsidiary issues such as the relationship between convention and awareness, its being abstract or material, and the nature of its destination are discussed as well.

KEY WORDS: convention, conventional affairs, mental action, intention, awareness, intentionality, background and content of ‘conventional’.

Investigation and Review of John Dewey’s View on Generalities

Muhammad Sadeq Ali-Pur / PhD of Comparative Philosophy IKI      msalipoor@yahoo.com

Muhammad Fanaie Eshkawari / Professor in Department of Philosophy IKI                      fanaei.ir@gmail.com

Received: 2017/07/03 - Accepted: 2018/04/18

ABSTRACT

The discussion on the nature of universal conceptions is one of the most important and most challenging issues in the history of philosophical thought. Some philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, believed that universal concepts have external instances, and some would deny this. Most empiricists have denied the external instances of universal concepts. John Dewey was an empiricist philosopher who believed, unlike most of them, that universal truths have instances in the external world. He would wish to preserve his empiricist foundations to find objective instances for universal concepts. “Method” was what helped him to achieve his goal. He claimed that ‘method’, while being an objective and general idea, is the external instance for universal truths. The subject of this article is to explain, analyze and review that hypothesis. The investigations showed that his empiricist explanation of universals is not persuasive, and that ‘method’ cannot resolve the problem thereof. Accordingly, he would have to choose between empiricism and accepting universal concepts.

KEY WORDS: category, species, typical propositions, universal propositions.

The Relationship between Criteria for Choosing the Best
Explanation and Realism

Amin Muʻazzami Gudarzi / MA in Philosophy of Science at IKI          aminmoazami242@yahoo.com

Akbar Mir-Sepah / Assistant Professor in IKI                                                 mirsepah@qabas.net

Received: 2017/08/09 - Accepted: 2018/03/15

ABSTRACT

According to what philosophers of science formulated about deduction of the best explanation, the hypothesis presenting the best explanation of phenomena and evidences is probably true. One of the objections made to this argument is the “objection of truth”. According to that objection, the following questions are asked: “On what basis does the result of the deduction of the best explanation guide us to truth and reality?” “Are the ‘criteria for selection’ the best explanation of communicating truth and reality?” In the present article, we have used a descriptive, analytical and critical approach to, firstly, investigate the relationship between the best-known criteria for deduction of explanation and the representation of reality, and secondly, to show that none can be a true criterion for representation of reality, although some of them such as ‘empirical sufficiency’ and ‘uniting’ are able to guide us to the real criterion of truth. In the second step, we use the discussions on calculation of probabilities – especially the invaluable discussions of the martyred scholar Sadr on justification of uncertain propositions (logical certainty) – to introduce “epistemological probability” and, accordingly, to present – for the first time – the real criterion for justification and the probable truth of the best explanation as “the most probable explanation from the viewpoint of epistemological probability”.

KEY WORDS: deduction of the best explanation, objection to truth, consistency, uniting, simplicity and probability of epistemological probability.

An Investigation of the Mutual Relationship of Intellect and Conscience in Mulla Sadra and Mirza Mahdi Isfahani’s View

Reza Rahnama / PhD in Islamic Philosophy Allama Tabatabaie University

                                                                                                                   reza.rahnama@gmail.com

Ghulam-Reza Zakiyani / Associate Professor in Department of Philosophy Allama Tabatabaie University

Received: 2017/05/30 - Accepted: 2018/01/15                                                  zakiany@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

In various parts in his works, while using theoretical intellect and discussion, Mulla Sadra speaks of conscience as a method. In his view, conscience is an intuition based on intuitive knowledge. Thus, it can resolve many problems related to the origin of existence and its returning point. In contrast, Mirza Mahdi Isfahani has strengthened his doctrinal foundations just on conscientious perception. In that type of perception, external realities are discovered as they are, without any existential connection. The present article aims at investigating the relationship between intellect and conscience from the viewpoints of those two thinkers. It will be clarified that although Mulla Sadra believes in some important mutual functions for intellect and conscience, he considers those two cognitive paths abreast of one another. In contrast, Mirza Isfahani does not regard them separately; rather, in his view, the intelligible things are part of items of conscience. In a more precise wording, some of the items of our conscience are acquired in the presence of our intellect.

KEY WORDS: conscience, intellect, school of separation, Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, Mulla Sadra.

Evaluating the Interpretation of Divine Decree and Providence in
Mulla Sadra’s Philosophical System

Nasrin Tawakkoli / Assistant Professor of Theology and Humanities Payam Noor UniversityReceived: 2017/10/31 - Accepted: 2018/06/15                                                                                                   tavakoli.nasrin@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The orders of divine knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s thought are as follows: Grace, Pen, Decree, Guarded Tablet, and Providence. Mulla Sadra deals with an interpretation of divine decree and providence comprehensively, and explains the actual decree and providence maintained by the theologians, while explaining the essential decree and providence maintained by Peripatetic philosophers. In the present article, we have used a descriptive-analytical method as well as Mulla Sadra’s various works to gather, classify, adjust and codify different interpretations of divine decree and providence in the philosophical system of transcendental theosophy, and enumerate its strong points as well as its deficiencies.

KEY WORDS: Grace, Pen, Decree, Providence, Mulla Sadra.

Formulation and Evaluation of Kant’s Argument for Negation of
‘Possibility of Theoretical Recognition of the Soul’

Ahmad Hamdullahi Oskuie / Assistant Professor in Shahid Madani University Azerbayejan ac.hamdollahi@azaruniv.edu

Masoud Omid / Associate Professor in Tabriz University                    masoud_omid1345@yahoo.com

Received: 2017/12/09 - Accepted: 2018/05/30

ABSTRACT

Considering the views of Kant, his argument for ‘no possibility of theoretical recognition of the soul’ can be formulated as follows: (a) no plurality of sensory intuitions is given from the soul (thinking ‘I’); (b) anything from which no plurality of sensory intuitions are given would be unrecognizable; as a result: the soul is unrecognizable. Formally, the argument is valid, and if we consider the soul, as the thinking ‘I’, as merely a transcendental and non-empirical reality, the result – of course just in the Kantian sense of cognition – would be absolutely true and valid. However, the ambiguity and incongruity in Kant’s view of the soul or ‘I’ falsifies and defaces the result of his argument, even in the realm of Kantian sense of cognition.

KEY WORDS: Kant, cognition, the soul, possibility of knowing the soul, possibility of metaphysics.

Comparative Investigation of Moral Freedom in
Kant and Mutahhari’s View

Ali Reza Farhang Isfahani / Faculty Member in Islamic Azad University Bandar Abbas

Received: 2017/09/06 - Accepted: 2018/05/17                                      Farhang.1397.D@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Freedom, especially the spiritual freedom, is one of the fundamental issues in both theoretical and practical philosophy. Its role is, however, more conspicuous in practical philosophy. The importance and necessity of this fact and its special position in resolving philosophical issues, especially the issues related to anthropology, has caused thinkers to pay special attention to it. In the present article, the views of two influential thinkers in the domain of Western and Islamic philosophy have been scrutinized through a descriptive-analytical method. One is Immanuel Kant, grown in the sphere of Christian culture, and the other is the Martyred Master Mutahhari, nurtured in the sphere of Islamic culture. Here, it is clarified that Kant has established, in his philosophy of morality, ‘freedom’ as the foundation of his arguments for morality. The fundamental idea of Kant’s morality is that the man’s action must be not only based on his duty but also merely based on duty and just out of respect for moral law. In this way, Kant reaches the fundamental concept in his philosophy of morality, i.e. the idea of autonomous will (autonomy). Unlike Kant, the Martyred Master Mutahhari does not establish a link between moral freedom and observing the law; rather, he relates it to observing divine laws and paying attention to the aspect of humanity in the man. According to that idea, moral freedom, human’s freedom from his own passions, the freedom of human’s humanity from his animal aspect, and his autonomy, are all manifested in his moral humanity.

KEY WORDS: spiritual freedom, moral action, practical wisdom, Kant, Martyr Mutahhari.