ABSTRACTS

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The Type and Scope of the Role of Existence
in Essential Predications in Allama Tabatabaie’s View

 

Sayyid Ahmad Husseini Sangchal / MA of Philosophy Tarbiat Modares University

                                                                                                    Hosseini.sangchal.ahmad@gmail.com

Muhammad Sa’idi Mehr  / Professor in Tarbiat Modarres University    saeedi@modares.ac.ir

Received: 2016/12/06 - Accepted: 2017/07/16

 

Abstract

After proving the originality of existence, investigating the role of existence in essential predications is of the same importance as originality of existence, and is somehow a completion to it. In his works, Allama Tabatabaie has dealt with resolving that puzzle, but it seems that the expositors have depleted those statements of innovation. In the present article, we criticize a view according to which existence plays role in the form of a part of substratum, in a way that the formation of essential attribution is realized through the essence becoming the substratum to the restriction of existence. Then, we defend a view that considers existence the whole substratum. According to that view, if the essential products are properly constructed in the form of a sentence, they would be, in effect, the attributes of existence. Besides, one cannot absolutely defend the role of existence being the whole substratum; rather, this precept is specified to the external effects of the essence, and the existence is not described by the mental effects of essence.

 

KEY WORDS: Existence, conditional mood, essential predications, Allama Tabatabaie.


Speculations on Allama Tabatabaie
and Ayatollah Jawadi’s Views On Personal Unity of Existence

Abbas Nikzad / Associate Professor in Department of Islamic Teachings Babol Medical University.               Nikzad37@yahoo.com

Received: 2016/08/28 - Accepted: 2017/06/01

 

Abstract

Those philosophers who are adherents of Mulla Sadra believe in gradation in orders of existence; in other words, they believe in unity of existence and at the same time in plurality of existence. On the contrary, mystics and Islamic sufis believe in personal unity of existence; that is, they regard existence as a personal unit which is the very existence of God Almighty and consider beings other than God as having a metaphorical and figurative existence, not a real existence. On the other hand, the philosophers believe in the plurality of existence and at the same time its unity. In correspondences between the late Sayyid Ahmad Karbalaie and Haj Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Isfahani (known as ‘Company’) in this regard, the former defended the mystics’ view while the latter defended the philosophers’ view. Allama Tabatabaie wrote annotations on those correspondences and, finally, supported the mystics’ view. He maintained that the philosophers’ argument on gradation of existence leads, in effect, to the mystics’ view. Indeed, the very argument of gradation leads us to personal unity of existence and negation of real plurality. Ayatollah Jawadi also believed that mysticism is based on personal unity of existence and philosophy is based on negation of real plurality of existence. In mysticism, the pure existence is the existence of One Being, and there is no other being along with it or in higher or lower order independently, and that the restricted or limited beings that are assumed are the signs and manifestations of the Necessary Being. In this article, we investigate and review the views of those two scholars and, finally, we prove the rightness of the philosophers’ view.

 

KEY WORDS: personal unity of existence, gradation of existence, mystics, philosophers, adherents of Mulla Sadra, Allama Tabatabaie, Ayatollah Jawadi.


An Investigation of Philosophers’ Arguments for Proving Fixity and Negating Movement in Incorporeal Beings

 

Yahya Nur-Muhammadi / PhD of Transcendental Theosophy IKI                                              

Received: 2017/06/01 - Accepted: 2017/05/01                     normohamadi2531@anjomedu.ir

 

Abstract

Most philosophers believe in fixity of incorporeal beings or abstractions and negate any movement in them. The most important basis and reason in that view is the argument of ‘potentiality and actuality’. In that argument, by emphasizing the contrast (privation and possession) of non-existence (potentiality) and existence (actuality), it is proved that potentiality is among the states of matter, and the body which has potentiality has matter as well. In this way, he negates any potentiality in incorporeal beings due to their simplicity and lacking a composition of potentiality and actuality. Since motion is something’s exit from potentiality to actuality, and a simple being which is not a composite of potentiality and actuality cannot move, fixity and impossibility of moving in incorporeal beings with their simple and non-passive existence is proved. However, it must be noted that the ‘potentiality’ in motion does not necessarily mean something with a peripatetic ‘material’ origin (as the deniers of peripatetic matter have also used potentiality in defining motion); rather, ‘potential’ and ‘potentiality’ is also consistent with the simplicity of mover and the subject of motion. Thus, the motion of incorporeal beings cannot be denied due to their simplicity and having no matter and their being peripatetic matter.

 

KWY WORDS: fixity, motion, incorporeal beings, matter, potentiality and actuality.


 

Explanation and Investigation of Epistemic Certainty in the Inductive Method of Sayyid Muhammad Baqer Sadr

Muhammad Muhammad Rezaie / Professor in Department of Philosophy of Religion and Islamic Philosophy Tehran University                                                                                                                    mmrezai391@yahoo.com

Sayyida Hura Musawi / MA of Islamic Philosophy and Theology Tehran University.

Received: 2016/09/13 - Accepted: 2017/04/22

 

Abstract

Sadr’s epistemology has criticized the solution presented by rationalists in returning of induction to experience and analogy as well as the solution presented by empiricists. It introduces its own inductive foundation on the basis of essential school according to which human’s knowledge would achieve, by essential reproduction and through induction, thematic certainty – and not logical one – after probable affirmations. Martyr Sadr’s inductive reasoning is interpreted on the basis of passing through two stages: the stage of achieving probable degrees and reinforcing it on the basis of synoptic knowledge up to the highest point of probability which is an inferential stage, and the stage of certainty achieved through essential reproduction and with the conditions of essential logic. In the second stage, the degree of affirmation reaches the level of certainty. This is done according to the axiomatic principle and the criterion for the truth of axiomatic nature of that principle and its distinction from imaginary axiomaticity, and consistency with other thematic certainties including the principle of collective knowledge and the refusal of preference without priority are dealt with. In the section on epistemological evaluation in Martyr Sadr’s view and by avoiding general sayings of Sadr’s school, considering the objection to Martyr Sadr’s moderate foundationalism in essential school and especially in view of the criterion for truth that has led it to coherence, it seems that Sadr’s epistemology, in spite of its success in explaining the probable affirmative order as well as the role of actor in affirmation, is not successful in realism of thematic certainty and suffers some basic drawbacks.

KEY WORDS: thematic certainty, induction, essential reproduction, moderate foundationalism.


A Critical Analysis of David Hume’s
View on the Essentiality and Identity of Mind

 

Muhammad Taqi Yusufi / Assistant Professor Baqer al-Uloom University  Yosofi@bou.ac.ir

Meytham Shadpur / PhD Student of Islamic Philosophy Baqer al-Uloom University.

Received: 2016/11/23 - Accepted: 2017/09/05                                        shadpoor6348@gmail.com

 

Abstract

David Hume has had a considerable effect on the modern philosophy with his empiricist approach. In his first and the most important philosophical book which was indeed a treatise on human’s nature, he dealt with an explanation of the essentiality and identity of the mind and the mental states. Here, we investigate and review Hume’s view using an analytical-descriptive method. In his negative position, Hume adduces some of the ambiguous or fallacious bases to maintain that the essentiality and identity and absolute simplicity of the mind are without effect and, accordingly, are senseless. In his positive position, however, he defends the essentiality and the imperfect identity of the mental states. Finally, due to contradictions in the positive position, he held that the skepticism is preferable. Skepticism, in Hume’s philosophy, means lack of satisfactory metaphysical account of natural beliefs, and not the lack of the natural beliefs themselves. The main problem in Hume’s account is his negligence of intuitive knowledge and the function of the intellect in using it. It seems that by adducing the intuitive knowledge, one can present a more persuasive account of the soul’s essentiality and its distinction from the phenomena and states of the soul. Accordingly, there is an essence called soul upon which the sensual states rest.

 

KEY WORDS: mind, mental states, essence, personal identity, Hume.


 

A Review on the Indescribability of Mystical Experiences

 

Murteza Rezaie / Assistant Professor in Department of Philosophy IKI arezaee4@gmail.com

Received: 2016/12/29 - Accepted: 2017/10/07

 

Abstract

Indescribability of mystical experiences is emphasized by mystics and philosophers in both west and east. Regarding the mystery of and reason for indescribability of the mystics’ states, some arguments have been put forward. The indescribability of mystical experiences necessitates that the mystics’ statements would be void of any sense and content, and as far as the realism is concerned, it must lack any value and validity. Can one find such a state? In justifying the value of the statements by mystics and regarding the meaning and content of their sayings, various interpretations and justifications have been presented by both mystics and non-mystics. The theories of Dionysius, metaphor and Stace are the three theories put forward in this regard. Each of them, however, has some drawbacks that make one not accept them. The theory suggested here is the fourth one that seeks to find the mystery of the indescribability of mystical experiences in certain factors and attempts to offer an explanation without the drawbacks of the aforementioned theories.

 

KEY WORDS: mystical experiences, indescribability, Dionysius’ theory, theory of metaphor, Stace’s theory.


 

An Investigation into Kant’s Copernican Revolution

 

Ahmad Sa’idi / Assistant Professor in IKI.                                     ahmadsaeidi67@yahoo.com

Received: 2016/12/06 - Accepted: 2017/08/17

 

Abstract

To answer the drawbacks put forward by skeptics and idealists, Kant suggested that a Copernican revolution be launched in the world of philosophy to seek to know the reality made according to our mind and perceptive faculties, instead of some knowledge in accordance with the real world. He claimed that the only way out of skepticism and idealism is to seek to know a reality formed in the mind. In other words, we must be satisfied with knowing the self-made world (mental entity) and consider the mental image of a thing as the thing itself (the reality itself). He thought that if one seeks to know, instead of ‘a reality independent of oneself’, ‘a reality made by his own perceptive faculties’, the certainty of his perceptions are ensured and the objections made by Berkeley and Hume are properly answered. In the present article, we have shown, by investigating Kan’s Copernican revolution and its logical implications, that Kan’s philosophy, in spite of his ample and admirable efforts, has not been successful in removing the doubts and is, indeed, another version of skepticism which would lead, logically, to pure idealism.

 

KEY WORDS: Kant, philosophy, entity, mind, skepticism, idealism.