Investigating the Real or Conventional Nature of “Right” in

Ayatollah Mesbah’s View

Sayyid Abbas Musawi (Assistant Professor of Department of Philosophy/ Al-Zahra University)

Sayyid Muhammad Reza Musawi (PhD Student of Law/ Tehran University)



The present article deals with one of the important philosophical discussions on “right”; that is the question of whether “right” in the usage of “having right” is a real entity or a conventional one. For example, when we say “God has the right to create” or “man has the right of living”, is this right, disregarding the making of the Maker, real in itself or a conventional one? If “right” is an objective reality, then all “rights” are among objective are discoverable realities,, and one must refer to objective realities to find out about them. Otherwise, the concept of “right” is among conventional affairs, does not show any reality and, in that case, all “rights” depend on the subjective consideration of those who create such conventions. Since Ayatolah Mesbah is among prominent and authoritative experts in human sciences, his view on the issue of “right” is an influential one. The present article attempts to investigate his view in this regard and is seeking to explain the claim that based on the foundations of Ayatollah Mesbah’s  ideas, as well as various meanings of the word “conventional”, “right” is not merely of a conventional nature; rather, one may consider a non-conventional nature for it as well.

KEY WORDS: right, real, objective, conventional, Ayatollah Mesbah             


An Explanation of the Existential Necessity of Active Intellect in

Ibn Sina’s View

Muhammad Hussein Abbasi (PhD Philosophy/ Tarbiat Modarres University)



Ibn Sina accepted, in his philosophical system, an abstract being, called Active Intellect, seeking to present a rational explanation for its existential necessity. Before him, Aristotle suggested the existence of Active Intellect in his own philosophy. Aristotle’s main concern was to resolve the issue of understanding universals, because in his philosophical system, the soul – as a material being – was not able to perceive immaterial intellectual forms. As a result, Aristotle necessarily believed in the non-material active intellect whose existential status for him is somehow ambiguous. In his attempt to resolve this issue, Ibn Sina took a different approach to explain the existence of active intellect. Was Ibn Sina successful in explaining the existential status of Active Intellect in his new approach? If yes, how did he deal with it? In the present article, after explaining Ibn Sina’s approach, we will use the principle "al-wahid" to prove the necessary existence of Active Intellect as the one granting intellectual forms; and finally, evaluate Ibn Sina’s view.

KEY WORDS: Active Intellect, passive intellect, longitudinal intellects, immaterail intellects, the principle of al-wahid, thinking soul, Ibn Sina.    

Overcoming Metaphysics

Abbas Ali Amiri (PhD Student of Transcendental Theosophy/ Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute)


Muhammad Fana’i Eshkawari (Professor of Department of Philosophy/ Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute)




Heidegger believed that Plato, with his theory of Ideas and by turning away from reality to truth, laid a foundation that affected the whole history of metaphysics. Separating the identifying agent and the identified thing continued in philosophy after Plato, and reached its zenith in Descartes’ philosophy. The subjectivity that resulted from such a distinction completely dominated man and deprived him from his status, culminating in the emergence of science and technology and bringing about homelessness for the modern man. Heidegger held that the way out from the domination of subjectivity was a return to the views of pre-Socratic philosophers, regarding a question about existence as a priority in his philosophical system. In Heidegger’s view, the only being that can put forward a question about existence is “Dasein” that is afloat in Being and can understand its meaning through its being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s ststen is such that encapsulates Islamic Philosophy as well. Thus, before any comparison and contrast between these two philosophies, one must pay enough attention to Heidegger’s basic criticisms on metaphysics so that one may be immune from any mistake on similarities and distinctions that exist between these two.

KEY WORDS: metaphysics, Being, Dasein, philosophy, human being, Heidegger.

The History of “Contrast Argument”

Mahdi Azimi (Assistant Professor in Tehran University)



Compiling “The History of Logics in the Islamic Period” needs much historical research on minor issues of that logic. The present inquiry focuses on one of them: proving the contradiction of “general negative” through a contrast between subject and its predicate (contrast argument), initiated by Theophrastus and Eudemus. This initiation reached Farabi and Ibn Sina in Translation Movement through Iskandar Afrudisi’s Fī In’ikās al-Muqaddamāt (translated by Abu ‘Uthman of Damascus). The contrast argument has experienced many vicissitudes throughout history of logics in Islam. We have discussed this fact in detail in the present article.

KEY WORDS: contradiction of general negative, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Iskandar Afrudisi, history of Islamic logics.     

Allama Tabataba'i’s Method in Inferring the Issues of Prescriptive Human Sciences from Normative Teachings of Religion

Abbas Gera’e (PhD Student of Transcendental Theosophy/ Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute)


Ali Mesbah (Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy/ Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute)



Defining descriptive and prescriptive human sciences and stating their differences in their respective methodologies, the present study shows that values, for Allama Tabataba'i, have an inescapable role in determining the goals and directing the issues of prescriptive human sciences. Accordingly, to produce felicity-generating prescriptive human sciences, we need a comprehensive and perfect system of values from the true religion. And since the issues of prescriptive human sciences are formed after determining the goal and achieving the necessary descriptions, Allama’s approach in inferring the issues of human sciences are explained in three stages: (1) collecting the necessary foundations and descriptions, (2) explaining, or – at least – considering, the goals of the true religion in a given issue, and (3) compiling the answer to that issue.

KEY WORDS: prescriptive human sciences, values, values of true religion      

Investigating the Views Opposing the Rule of Maximum Congruence between

Cause and Effect

Hujjatullah Marzani (Assistant Professor of Department of Islamic Teachings/ Azad Islamic University of Karaj)




One of the important subsidiaries of the principle of causality is the rule of congruence between cause and effect, which has led to an opposition between the philosophers adhering this rule and those opposing it. Those oppositions may be divided into two groups considering two states of a minimum and a maximum congruence. The state of minimum congruence is meaningful in philosophical systems before transcendental theosophy, and the state of maximum congruence are explained by considering the special bases of transcendental theosophy such as principality of existence and gradation of existence. The opponents of minimum congruence are theologians, especially Ash’arites, and the opponents of maximum congruence consist of various groups including some philosophers opposing transcendental theosophy, some legal theoreticians (Usūliyyūn) and some separationists (Tafkīkīyyūn). In the present article, we have dealt with an analysis and review of the opponents of maximum congruence and their answer on the basis of transcendental theosophy.

KEY WORDS: causality, congruence between cause and effect, necessity of cause and effect, principality of existence, gradation of existence, unity of existence.          

The Functions of Analytical Causality in Argument

Sayyid Mustafa Musawi A’zam (Assistant Professor in Department of theology and Islamic Teachings/ Yasuj University)



Dividing causality into external and analytical ones has many functions in Islamic philosophy; one of them is in the sphere of argument (burhān). Argument as the only reliable logical method in obtaining certainty is the breeding ground for some evolutions and functions through analytical causality: (1) the efficiency conjunctive categorical argument, (2) exclusivism of various types of argument in “apriori”, “cause”, and “absolute inna” (the effects of one cause), and refutation of argument of “general concomitants”, and (3) the possibility of putting forward an apriori argument in proving existence of God Almighty and review of the “quasi-apriori” argument are among the effects of analytical causality in the realm of argument.

KEY WORDS: function, analytical causality, the argument of general concomitants, apriori argument, argument of absolute inna, quasi-apriori argument.