معرفت فلسفی

Nature of Analytical Causality: A New Proposal for the Classification of Causality in Islamic Philosophy

Gholamreza Fayyazi[1]

@Seyyed Mustafa Musavi Azam[2]

Abstracts

The present article is an attempt towards explaining the nature of a neglected type of causality, i.e. analytical causality. Clarification of the meaning of causality is the first step. Two premises are raised in this regard. Firstly the distinction between "concept", meaning, extension, and reality is made. Then it is explained that the principal field of research for philosophers here is the meaning. Secondly a single affair is capable of applying to multiple meanings. According to these two premises, analytical causality seems not only reasonable but necessary. Although not asserting analytical causality as a type of causality, Islamic philosophers have frequently used the word "causality" in cases where no existential otherness is present between the cause and effect.

Based on the rule of "there is no concomitance without causality" recognized unanimously by Islamic philosophers, it is possible to justify the following examples as those of analytical causality: the concomitance between subjective considerations as fact- themselves, that of existence and quiddity, that of the two necessary beings by themselves (names and attributes of God with His essence), and that of the two impossible beings by themselves (circularity in argument and priority of a thing to itself). In spite of equivocal homonymy, external and analytical causality are distinct as being primary intelligible or secondary one, being an example of two opposites or not, and their domain. Proposing analytical causality requires further explanation towards classification of causality finally dealt with in the article.

Keywords: causality, meaning, concept, concomitance, analytical causality, external causality, analysis, abeyance

A Study of the Nature of Islamic Philosophy, with an Approach of Responding to its Opponents

Mohammad Sarbakhshi[3]

Abstracts

The perception opponents of philosophy hold about its reality is not the same as what philosophers themselves mean by it. Some of them consider the reality of philosophy as playing with concepts, explaining them, and, in its ideal level, presenting demonstrations. Even some have questioned the demonstrative nature of philosophy. However, paying careful attention to the definitions of philosophers themselves and their assertions indicates that philosophy from their perspective has a very comprehensive reality covering all fields of knowledge and practice. This perception is at least the dominant one among Islamic philosophers. Lack of careful consideration of the real meaning of philosophy has given rise to raising numerous objections to it. These objections have a clearer manifestation in the words of particularly those who claim piety and suppose philosophy in conflict with religion. The present article is an attempt to show that philosophy is not only a demonstrative discipline, but practice is a part of its reality. A real philosopher is one who in addition to his mastering the domain of knowledge has reached perfection in terms of practicing ethical commandments.

Keywords: philosophy, reality, judgment, practice, faith, Islamic philosophy, opposing philosophy.

Unity of Soul with Active Intellect in Islamic Philosophy; a Comparative-Critical Study

Mahdi Abdollahi[4]

Abstracts

Active intellect is the efficient cause and the governor of the material world. In addition, as a source of intellectual forms, active intellect bestows these forms on human soul. Following Ibn Sina in negating the unity of soul with active intellect, peripatetic and illuminative philosophers believed that receiving mental forms is only possible through the relation of soul with active intellect.

However, defending the unity of soul with active intellect in two fields, Mulla Sadra has responded to the objections of Ibn Sina. Responding to the objections of the earlier philosophers concerning the unity of soul with active intellect while relying on Mulla Sadra׳s remarks, the author has explained his view in this regard. The author has raised his objections to Mulla Sadra׳s view concerning the unity of soul with active intellect towards intellectual understanding, and has considered the arguments of the unity of soul with active intellect from the very beginning of the process of intellectual understanding inadequate. It is only after undergoing the stages of intensity of the substance that soul reaches unity with active intellect i.e. the second step of Mulla sadra in his argument. By this unity is meant the essential perfection of the soul and its transformation into intellect. According to the author, there is an important question before Mulla Sadra in this regard too. The question is: if several men achieve the stage of unity with active intellect, is it possible to believe in the numerical multiplicity of active intellect, given the fact that in his opinion every intellect is a unique species. The author has also raised certain objections to this rule.

Keywords: soul, active intellect, acquired intellect, perfection of human soul, unity of soul with active intellect.

Declining Infinite Regress in Mirdamad׳s Philosophy and its Criticism in Transcendental Philosophy

@Morteza Bayat[5]

Ehsan Mansoori[6]

Abstracts

Regress is one of the oldest philosophical problems raised by Aristotle. The first serious research on the problem of declining infinite regress was carried out by Mirdamad. By declining infinite regress is meant setting the cause at the beginning of the chain without effects coming to the end. Defining particular conditions for disproving regress, Mirdamad does not consider declining regress impossible. He holds that the two conditions i.e. the intellectual agreement of the cause with the effect, and the sameness of the direction of successive order with that of the infinity of causes are missing in declining regress, thus the latter not being impossible. Relying on contingency with perpetual and eternal duration, posteriority of effect to its nonexistence in cause, and the foundations of priority in terms of cause, Mirdamad believes that this type of regress is not impossible. Giving the effect the role of relation in respect to the cause, and taking its dependence into consideration, Mulla Sadra holds that such a problem is not raised at all, and in case it is, regress will have an end. On the other hand, Sadrite philosophers have taken the objective agreement of existence into consideration criticizing Mirdamad׳s view.

Keywords: progressive and declining infinite regress, Mirdamad, transcendent wisdom

A Study of Quine׳s View Concerning Predicative Existence

@Masoud Sadeqi[7]

Askar Soleymani Amiri[8]

Abstracts

If we say: "Pegasus exists" we would suffer from tautology, and if we say " Pegasus does not exist", we have made a self-contradictory proposition, since the word "Pegasus" refers to something in the external world. Attempting to eliminate this difficulty, following other analytical philosophers, and believing that existential propositions are the same type as those of identity, Quine has philosophically denied the peculiarity of existence, and has logically denied the capability of existence to be predicate. Thus he has regarded the maximum function of existence as playing the role of quantifier. Although denying predicative existence has originated from Hume and Kant, it has reached its zenith with Quine and other analytical philosophers. Presenting Mulla Sadra׳s view as a yardstick on distinguishing "subsistence of a thing" in simple whethernesses, from "subsistence of a thing for another thing" in composite whethernesses, we clearly come to the conclusion that Quine׳s attempt is abortive. Furthermore, discussion of predicative existence is a philosophical and logical one rather than a logico -linguistic one, as held by Quine and his followers. His argument is questionable since he imagines whethernesses, including simple and composite ones, signify subsistence of a thing for another thing. In addition, identity is ambiguous in his theory, since identity presupposes existence itself.

Keywords: predicative existence, peculiarity, quantifier, identity, self-contradictory, Quine, Sadr al- Mutaallihin

Mulla Sadra׳s View on the Death of Human Being; a Critical Analysis with Special Focus on Ibn Sina׳s Views

@Ghasem Amjadian[9]

Askar Dirbaz[10]

Abstracts

Referring to the meaning of death and its different types, the present article has raised various approaches concerning the real cause of human being death in an attempt to understand its real cause. Thus the article proceeds a comparative study of the views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra towards clarifying the true and authentic view about the real cause of death. Ibn Sina׳s view considering the collapse of temperament balance through domination of instinctive heat as the real cause of death has met three objections by Mulla Sdra. Relying on these objections, Mulla Sadra rejects Ibn Sina׳s view and holds that the real cause of death is the perfection of human being soul and turning away of the soul from the body. Studying the objections of Mulla Sadra and criticizing his view, the authors have come to the conclusion that the real cause of death is the very disturbance of the temperament balance and spoil of the body. They believe that Mulla Sadra׳s view corresponds more with voluntary death rather than natural one.

Keywords: human being, death, natural death, Ibn Sina, Sadr al- Mutaallihin.