تناقضباوری1
چکیده و کلیدواژه فارسی (Persian)
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- ـ طباطبائی، سید محمدحسین، اصول فلسفه و روش رئالیسم، ج1؛
- ـ فخر رازی، المباحث المشرقیه؛
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- - A Dictionary of philosophy, New edition by A. L. Lacey, (London: Routledge, 1996);
- - Graham Priest, "Dialetheism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, (Fall, 1999 Edition)Edward N. Zalta. (ed) URL= http: // plato. Stanford. Edu/ archives/ fall 1999/ entries/ Russell.
- - James Baillie, Contemporary analytic philosophy, (New Jersy: Prentice Hall, 1996) Dialetheism Graham Priest Trans: Rahmatollah Ridae The Present article by Graham Priest, the contemporary logician and writer, seeks to deny the widely-held logical principle of non-contradiction (the principle that the conjunction of a proposition and itsnegation is impossible) and assert that contradictions one poth possible and verifiable in centrast to the standard logic in which contradictionsare always false. To affirm his position, he brings to light so me cases (propositions) which are paradoxical and do not belony to any specific time or place. He gives some examples taken from both western and eastern philosophies, stating that the arguments for the principle in question are open to some objection, and concludes that standard logicgets nowhere against
- dialetheism by insisting that contradictions are always false, for dialetheism admits this but adds that they are true too.
- The translator of the article makes some remarks on Priest's view of contradictions, insisting that the conjunction of a proposition and is negation is impossible. To prove this, he examines some arguments give by Aristotle and considers them sound enough to refute Priest's view, and elaborates on some of the propositions Priest uses to establish his position and concludes his discassion by stating that the impossibility of contradictions is self-evident for any mind or common sense at any time or place. The only difficulty arises from the fact that it has been misconceived by some thinkers and much of its denial comes from the very misconception.
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