Ma`rifat Falsafi

Moral ontology and moral logic constitute the key discussions in metaethics. The primary issue in moral ontology concerns whether values are real, while in moral logic, the focus is on whether "ought" can be derived from "is." Viewing the deep interconnection between metaethical issues, the impossibility of deriving "ought" from "is" is often seen as a corollary of moral none-realism. However, despite his belief in the reality of values, Moore rejects the derivation of "ought" from "is." Adopting a descriptive-analytical method, this article first explains Moore's perspective on this matter and then critically examines it. As its innovation, the findings reveal that Moore's view rejecting the derivation of "ought" from "is" is flawed. This flaw stems from his incorrect analysis of moral realism and the way he draws moral values from reality.