The Knowledge Argument is proposed to refute physicalism. Physicalism posits that everything is physical, suggesting that physical knowledge is sufficient to comprehend all aspects of the world. However, through an intellectual examination, the aforementioned argument demonstrates that even if we possessed all possible physical knowledge, we would still encounter certain phenomena (such as mental phenomena) that provide us with new forms of knowledge.
Some critics have argued that even if the criticisms against the argument’s premises are set aside, the Knowledge Argument can, at most, prove an epistemic and explanatory gap between mental and physical phenomena. The present article focuses primarily on demonstrating that the Knowledge Argument does not fail to prove an ontological gap as well.
Title :سنجش توانایی برهان معرفت در اثبات شکاف هستیشناختی و ابطال فیزیکالیسم
Abstract:
رسالت برهان معرفت (Knowledge Argument)، ابطال فیزیکالیسم است. فیزیکالیسم میگوید هر چیزی فیزیکی است، یعنی معرفتهای فیزیکی برای شناخت تمام امور جهان کافی است. برهان مذکور با طرح آزمایش فکری نشان میدهد اگر تمام معرفتهای فیزیکی را هم در اختیار داشته باشیم، باز با اموری (مانند امور ذهنی) مواجه میشویم که معرفتهای جدیدی به ما میدهند. برخی اشکال گرفتهاند بر فرض رفع نقدهای مقدمات استدلال، برهان مذکور حداکثر، اثباتکننده شکاف معرفتشناختی و تبیینی بین امور ذهنی و امور فیزیکی است. مقاله حاضر عمده تمرکزش روی این مسئله است که نشان دهد برهان معرفت توان اثبات شکاف هستیشناختی را نیز دارد.
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Mohammad hasan Fateminia; Yousof Daneshwar."Assessing the Capacity of the Knowledge Argument to Prove the Ontological Gap and Refute Physicalism". Ma`rifat Falsafi, 23, 3, 2026, 29-44
Fateminia, M, Daneshwar, Y.(2026) 'Assessing the Capacity of the Knowledge Argument to Prove the Ontological Gap and Refute Physicalism', Ma`rifat Falsafi, 23(3), pp. 29-44
Fateminia, M, Daneshwar, Y. Assessing the Capacity of the Knowledge Argument to Prove the Ontological Gap and Refute Physicalism. Ma`rifat Falsafi, 2026; 23(3): 29-44