Superiority of Neo-Aristotelian Virtue-centered Epistemology in Moral Evaluation of Belief

Sa’ida Fakhkhar Noghani / Assistant Professor in Department of Philosophy al-Mustafa International University Mashhad Branch                                                                                                               

Received: 2019/11/17 - Accepted: 2020/05/21


The moral evaluation of belief is one of the issues of discussion in epistemology. Accepting this fact is based on a proper approach in epistemology that allows the moral evaluation of belief. The Neo-Aristotelian approach in virtue-centered epistemology, now well-known with Mrs. Linda Zagzebski, has put forward some reasons for the superiority of that approach in explanation of aforementioned issue. These reasons are as follows: superiority of virtue-centered epistemology over other related approaches, problems of contemporary epistemology due to focus on the issue of skepticism and neglecting understanding and, finally, reasons related to philosophy of mind which deals with the relationship between belief and emotion. She continues her discussion with the relationship between belief and morality and considers a general meaning for libertarianism to pose the possibility of moral evaluation of all levels of knowledge. The main critique of this writing is on expanding liberty to all varieties of knowledge.

KEY WORDS: virtue-centered epistemology, Neo-Aristotelian approach, moral evaluation of belief, libertarianism, Zagzebski.



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